Abstract: We analyze the interaction between electoral accountability and separation-of-powers as mechanisms for reducing political agency slack. We compare three stylized regimes: a �Unilateral Authority� setting in which the President has exclusive authority over some policy decision; a �Mandatory Checks and Bal-ances� regime in which the President cannot enact the policy unless Congress approves; and an �Opt-In Checks and Balances� system in which the President may seek congressional authorization, but may also act unilaterally. The analysis generates three principal insights. First, voters respond to the risk of politi-cian bias by making the political rewards and punishments for policy success or failure asymmetric. Vot-ers rely less on this instrument, however, when internal checks screen out some undesirable policies. Second, the addition of a veto player need not alter the ex ante likelihood of policy change. Third, voter welfare is highest under the Opt-In Checks regime and lowest under the Unilateral Authority regime.